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This study investigates the effect of consumption externalities on 
entry decision in network industries. A non-monotonic relation exists 
in the monopoly/duopoly profit differential. A monopolist which has 
to pay a cost to maintain his dominant position, such as a license 
fee or lobby expenditures, can block more easily entry for a wide 
range of network externalities unless these externalities are not 
exceedingly intense. Therefore, network externalities work as an 
“innocent” barrier to entry. The capacity choice of the incumbent in 
a “capacity-then-production” model reinforces the “innocent” entry 
barrier effect for the potential entrant.
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I. Introduction
The relevance of network industries in contemporary economics is 
continuously increasing. The most tangible examples of this phenomenon 
are the broad diffusion of mobile devices and the widespread use of 
computers and related software in social and economic activities. 
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Network goods refer to products in which the utility of a typical 
consumer increases when the number of other clients/users (i.e., the 
purchase expansion) of the products further increases. The reason why 
a single client/user aspires to buy a product is related to the fact that 
other clients/users are buying this product. Moreover, other product 
users can positively affect the demand in the presence of network goods 
because their number can signify quality and availability of after-sale 
services for abiding consumers. 
Growing literature is motivated by the recent increasing importance 
of network industries and has started analyzing how the presence of 
positive consumption externalities/network effects alters the results of 
standard models of imperfect competition (Katz, and Shapiro 1985; Cabral 
et al. 1999) and industrial organization. In particular, scholars have lately 
focused on the role of strategic delegation (Hoernig 2012; Chirco, and 
Scrimitore 2013; Battacharjee, and Pal 2014). The present work takes a 
different route and studies the effects of network externalities on entry.  
Economides (1996) investigates such effects in a context without fixed 
entry costs. Two counterbalancing forces work to determine the outcome 
of the entry problem: 1) the usual standard competition effect, that is, 
entry reduces the profits of the incumbent; and 2) the specific network 
effect, that is, when the expected production by consumers is high, their 
willingness to pay for them is high, and thus, the demand is high. 
Economides (1996) mentions that the second effect will always prevail 
in the linear case of demand expectation functions, and thus, the in- 
cumbent monopolist will always invite entrants. Kim (2002) reconsiders 
the result of Economides (1996) and demonstrates that it is inapplicable, 
particularly for homogeneous goods.1 However, the present study shows 
that the network effect cannot exceed the competition effect in the case 
of linear functions. Moreover, the analysis of the different influences of 
the network effect intensity on the profits of the incumbent and the 
entrant indicates that network externality favor the block of market entry 
when the externality is not excessively strong. To guarantee his monopoly 
position, we assume that the monopolist has to pay a cost to establish 
a barrier to entry, such as a license fee or lobby expenditures. In this 
sense, network externalities are structural or “innocent” barriers to 
1 “This is because, if the incumbent’s profit is higher under competition (oligo- 
poly) than under monopoly, then the incumbent monopolist can make even higher 
profit by simply duplicating the oligopoly price at no additional cost.” (Kim, 2002, 
p. 398). 
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entry.    
Church, and Ware (1999, p. 487) (reported in McAfee et al. 2003, p. 
10) distinguish between structural (“innocent”) and strategic entry bar- 
riers. However, they retain the term “barrier to entry” only for structural 
barriers, that is, “a structural characteristic of a market that protects 
the market power of incumbents by making entry unprofitable.” The 
definition of strategic behavior differs from the previous one because 
strategic behavior implies that the actions of incumbents influence en- 
trance choice (e.g., inflicting losses to entrants).2
Spence (1977) studies the strategic choice of capacity of incumbents 
in the presence of potential entry in an industry with standard goods. 
The author distinguishes between capacity and quantity produced. The 
capacity amount invested by the incumbent during the first period is a 
constraint on the subsequent quantity produced. The incumbent will 
accommodate entry if the costs of the entry are sufficiently low. Under 
threat of entry, the incumbent can fix an adequately high capacity and 
eventually expand its output level to exert downward pressure on the 
price and deter the entry of a potential competitor. However, the ca- 
pacity becomes underutilized if entry does not occur because costs are 
prohibitive. The current study does not use the definition of strategic 
barrier to entry, and instead, analyzes how the structural characteristic 
of network externality affects the profits of the incumbent and the 
entrant.3 The present study also introduces capacity choice and extends 
the standard quantity game, which is mainly regarded not as a strategic 
choice of the incumbent to deter entry but as a post-entry strategic tool 
in duopoly competition.4
2 For a comprehensive discussion of the various definitions of “barriers to 
entry” in economics, see McAfee et al., (2003, 2004). 
3 We note that in a different multi-stage game context with unions, Bughin 
(1999), Buccella (2011), and Fanti, and Buccella (2015, 2016) study the effect on 
entry of different alternative labor market institutions and various bargaining 
agendas both as structural and strategic barriers because agenda selection during 
negotiation can be used as an entry-deterrence tool. 
4 In general, an increasing market competition caused by entry is widely 
known to lead to a reduction in incumbent profits; however, numerous papers 
have recently challenged this view and offered different alternative reasons for 
the possibility of profit raising entry (Tyagi 1999; Naylor 2002a, b; Mukherjee et 
al., 2009 for a profit raising entry effect of vertical relationships). Lee, and Choi 
(2002) extend the analysis to the cost of entry and the social benefit in a 
Cournot-Nash framework when the government attempts to eliminate entry 
regulations.
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This study adopts the definition of Church and Ware (1999) and finds 
that network externalities represent a structural barrier to entry. A non- 
monotonic relation exists in the monopoly/duopoly profit differential, 
which depends on the intensity of network externalities with and with- 
out capacity choice. Thus, if the monopolist has to pay a license fee to 
the government or for the cost of lobbying to influence market regula- 
tions to deter entry, then the costs can be considerably high, and the 
entry cannot be prevented in a market with standard goods. By contrast, 
the profit differential in a market with consumption externalities in- 
creases. Thus, the costs for deterring entry may be safely sustained. 
Therefore, the incumbent can deter market entry because of the network 
effect, unless the intensity of the externalities is not excessively strong. 
The incentive to block market entry increases up to a certain level of 
network externalities and then subsequently decreases. Moreover, when 
the capacity choice is considered, the “capacity-then-production” game 
alters the results as follows. 1) The incumbent is able to pay relatively 
higher license fees/lobby expenditures to block entry. 2) The strategic 
capacity choice in the presence of network effects has a costly influence 
on the duopoly profits that is stronger than without capacity. This con- 
dition amplifies the incumbent/entrant profit differential. 3) The incum- 
bent blocks entry to all degrees of network externality if license fees/ 
lobby expenditures are not prohibitive. Therefore, the role of the network 
effect as barrier to entry is magnified by the presence of capacity choice.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the proposed model. First, the basic ingredients of an industry 
with network effects are presented. Second, a “capacity-then-production” 
framework is developed, and the analysis of entry in this context is 
discussed. Finally, the last section summarizes the key results and 
implications and suggests possible directions for future research.  
II. Proposed Model  
The present work assumes that the simple mechanism of network 
externalities is as follows. The surplus obtained by the client of a firm 
increases directly with the number of clients of the firm (Katz, and 
Shapiro 1985).  
From the recent literature (Hoernig 2012; Battacharjee, and Pal 2014; 
Chirco, and Scrimitore 2013), the monopolist faces the following linear 
direct demand:
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= − + ,q a p ny                           (1)
where q denotes the quantity of the goods produced, and y denotes 
consumer expectation of the equilibrium production of the monopolist. 
The parameter n∈[0, 1) represents the strength of the network effects. 
When the value of the parameter is high, the externalities are strong.
The inverse demand function is 
　　　
= − + ,p a q ny 　                       (2) 
where p is the price of goods. The marginal cost of a firm is considered 
c＝0 to focus on the effects of network externalities in this industry. An 
alternative interpretation of the latter condition is that the labor market 
is not unionized, and the firm can hire workers at a competitive wage, 
which is normalized to zero.
A. Benchmark: No capacity choice
The profit function of a monopolist in a framework without capacity 
choice is
Π = − +( ) .a q ny q                       (3)




                         
(4)
As shown in Equation (4), the equilibrium output level is obtained 






n                          (5)
where the upper script M stands for “monopoly.” After substituting 
Equation (5) into Equation  (3), the monopoly profits are 






n                             (6)
The case of entry is now considered. Firm 1 is defined as the incum- 
bent, whereas Firm 2 is defined as the potential entrant. The demand 
function in duopoly becomes 
= − − + +1 2 1 2( ).p a q q n y y                      (7)
The profit functions of firms are
Π =1 1,pq                              (8)
Π = −2 2 ,pq E                            (9)
for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. E represents an exo- 
genous fixed cost faced by the entrant. 
From Equations (8) and (9), the maximization problem and “rational 










q i j i j
n               (10)
The condition n∈[0, 1) ensures that the reaction functions are nega- 
tively sloped (i.e., (∂qi)/(∂qj)＜0) and that goods are strategic substi- 
tutes. Moreover, |(∂qi)/(∂qj)|＜1, which guarantees the stability of the 
system.5 The system of equations in Equation (10) is solved, and the 






n                       (11)
The duopoly profits in equilibrium are obtained by substituting 
5 The intensity of network effects cannot be excessively strong with linear 
demand and expectation functions. Thus, the network effect cannot counterbalance 
the competition effect. Therefore, the network effect can never represent an 
invite to entry, which is in contrast to the claim of Economides (1996). 
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Note: The graph is drawn for a＝1. 
FIGURE 1 
PLOT OF THE PROFIT DIFFERENTIAL 
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D a
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(12)
where the superscript D stands for “duopoly.” 
The results are briefly discussed as follows. Figure 1 plots the 





humped shape of Δ suggests that the incumbent has an incentive to 
block entry up to a certain level. The following exercise shows this 
nonlinear relationship between n and the incentive to block. 
Suppose that the monopolist has to pay cost T to establish a barrier 
to entry, such as a license fee to be paid to the government or lobby 
expenditures. The first column presents the intensity of the network 
effect. The second column shows the monopoly profits in Equation (6), 
whereas the third column shows the duopoly profits in Equation (12). 
The fourth column describes the amount of the license fee/lobby costs. 
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Note: All values are calculated for a＝1 and E＝0.
TABLE 1 
NETWORK EFFECTS AS “INNOCENT” BARRIERS TO ENTRY
The costs in the current exercise are set as T＝0.14, such that the firm 
cannot preserve the monopoly position at n＝0 (standard goods). The 
fifth column reports the net profit of the monopolist. Finally, column 
six evaluates the difference between the net profits of the monopolist 
and the duopoly profits. When the value is positive, the incumbent 
finds paying T to be profitable and keeps the competitor out of the 
market. By contrast, a duopoly will be better when the value is nega- 
tive.
The column shows that the monopolist is increasingly able to pay the 
costs as the network effect intensifies until n*＝0.649. The incumbent 
has no incentive to pay T at n＝0.9. The conceivable presence of fixed 
costs for the entrant simply reinforces this mechanism.
Table 1 reports the findings of this exercise, which is graphically re- 
presented in Figure 2, in which ΔT＝ΠM－T－ΠD. The preceding discus- 
sion is summarized in the following result.
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Note: The graph is depicted for a＝1 and E＝0.
FIGURE 2 
NETWORK EFFECTS AS “INNOCENT” BARRIERS TO ENTRY (GRAPHICAL 
REPRESENTATION)
Result 1. Network externalities represent “innocent” barriers to entry 
unless they are excessively strong. 
Therefore, apart from investment in technology and in research and 
development activities, the presence of various intensities of network 
effects in different segments of network industries can represent an 
additional factor that may explain both the presence of monolithic 
giants and competitive product markets. In other words, network effects 
may influence the market structure. 
B. “Capacity-then-production” choice
A “capacity-then-quantity” game is considered. Following Vives (1986), 
Nishimori, and Ogawa (2004), Ogawa (2006), Barcena-Ruiz, and Garzón 
(2007), and Fanti, and Meccheri (2016), the firm has the following 
quadratic cost C(x, q)＝(x－q)
2, where x is the capacity scale of the firm, 
and q is the production quantity. When Equation (2) is given, the profit 
function of the monopolist becomes 
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Π = − + − − 2( ) ( ) .a q ny q x q                     (13)
The cost function C(x, q) has a U-shaped form, such that the long-run 
average cost reaches the minimum when production is equal to capacity, 
that is, when x＝q. When the firm chooses output (i.e., the second and 
last stage), over capacity is achieved if x＞q, whereas under capacity is 
achieved if x＜q. The capacity choice represents a commitment on 
capacity. However, the quantity choice of a firm is not committed. That 
is, the capacity choice provides consumers with nothing more but in- 
formation that the discrepancy between the capacity and the optimal 
output level is costly for the firm. However, the capacity commitment of 
the firm does not directly alter the formation of expectations with regard 
to the output level produced by the firm. 
The maximization of Equation (13) yields
+ += 2 .
4
a ny xq
                        (14)
From Equation (14), the output level in equilibrium after imposing 
the “rational expectation” condition is
+=
−
( 2 ) .
4
a xq
n                          (15)
After substituting Equation (15) into Equation (13), the monopoly 
profits are








a ax n n
n                  
(16) 
where the subscript c stands for “capacity.” Therefore, the monopolist 









n n                        (17)
with (∂x)/(∂n)＞0: An increase in the intensity of network externalities 
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causes the firm to expand its capacity.6 The following equation is ob- 








n n                        
(18)
The direct comparison between Equations (17) and (18) shows that 
xc
M＞qc







excess capacity increases as network externalities increase. Equations 
(17) and (18) are substituted into Equation (13). Rational expectations 










n n                      
 (19)
When the case of entry is considered, the demand function is presented 
in Equation (7). However, the profit functions of firms are
Π = − − 21 1 1 1( ) ,pq x q                      (20)
Π = − − −22 2 2 2( ) ,pq x q E                    (21)
for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively, with E as the exogenous 
fixed cost faced by the entrant.
The maximization of Equations (20) and (21) in the product market 
competition stage and the further imposition of the “rational expectation” 
conditions yield
6 Note that the monopolist, by definition, has not to use strategically the 





shown by comparing Equations (17) and (18)). This means that the presence of 
network effects crucially makes profitable to invest in costly unused capacity. 
The rationale for this choice is that the monopolist is able to meet a larger 
demand, and this effect is particularly magnified when the market size is not too 
large (i.e. a is relatively small, see Equation (18)).  









a n q x
q i j i j
n           
 (22)
　　　
The system of equations is solved in Equation (22). The output of 
firms as a function of the capacities is
+ − − −
= ≠ =
−
3 8 2 2 ( )
, , , 1,2.
15 6
i j i j
i
a x x n x x
q i j i j
n           
(23)
 
The substitution of the equations in Equation (23) into the profit 
functions of the firms allows us to derive the expressions for the duopoly 
profits as the functions of capacity choices.
⎧ ⎫− − + + − + −
⎪ ⎪
⎨ ⎬
− + − + −⎪ ⎪
⎩ ⎭Π =
−
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
, 2
(8 16 28 ) [116 (80 24 ) 24 16 ]
297 (96 64 ) 18( )
3
9(5 2 )
i i j i i j i j j
i j i j
D
i c
x x x x n x x a x ax x n
x a x x a x
n  
(24)
Thus, each firm in the capacity choice stage maximizes Equation (24) 
with respect to xi, i＝1, 2, which implies that 





4(12 3 8 10 2 )




a an x nx n x
x i j i j
n n       
(25)
with (∂xi)/(∂n)＞0, similar to before, and (∂xi)/(∂xj)＜0. The capacity 
choice of one firm is negatively related to the capacity choice of its rival. 
The system of equations in Equation (25) is solved. The capacity in 
equilibrium of firms is 
−= =
− +, 2
4 (4 ) 1, 2.
12 52 43i c
a nx i
n n                 
(26)
Substituting Equation (26) into Equation (23) yields
−= =
− +, 2
3 (5 2 ) 1, 2.
12 52 43i c
a nq i
n n                
 (27)
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　Note: The graph is drawn for a＝1.
FIGURE 3
PLOT OF THE PROFIT DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN MONOPOLY AND DUOPOLY 









c. That is, the firms 
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n
Excess capacity increases with network externalities.
When Equations (26) and (27) are substituted back into Equation 
(24), we obtain the equilibrium profits in duopoly as follows:








a n n i
n n               
(28)




c, which is depicted in 
Figure 3. The non-monotonic relation in the profit differential in the 
presence of network externalities is confirmed in the “capacity-then- 
production” model, which shows that the incentive to block entry 
persists. The exercise presented in the previous subsection is repeated 
to analyze the effect of capacity choice. The costs of the incumbent are 
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Note: All values are calculated for a＝1 and E＝0.  
TABLE 2
NETWORK EFFECTS AS “INNOCENT” BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN A 
“CAPACITY-THEN-PRODUCTION” MODEL.
set as T＝0.15, such that the monopoly position cannot be maintained 
at n＝0. The results in Table 2 indicate that the monopolist is pro- 
gressively more able to pay the costs as network externalities increase 
until nc
*＝0.873. Moreover, the duopoly is more profitable for the incum- 
bent at n＝0.985. The possible presence of fixed costs for the entrant 





.    
A direct comparison with the results in Subsection II-A. shows the 
following findings with capacity choice. 1) The incumbent can pay higher 
license fees/lobby expenditures to block entry than without capacity. 2) 
The maximal residual profits after paying T is at a level of network 
intensity that is higher than without capacity (nc
*＞n*). 3) If T is not 
prohibitive, the incumbent may virtually block entry no matter degree 
of n. The next result summarizes the preceding discussion.  
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         Note: The graph is depicted for a＝1 and E＝0.  
FIGURE 4 
NETWORK EFFECTS AS “INOCENT” BRRIERS TO ENTRY IN A 
“CAPACITY-THEN-PRODUCTION” MODEL 
   Note: The graph is drawn for a＝1.
FIGURE 5
PLOT OF THE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN PROFIT DIFFERENTIALS WITHOUT 
CAPACITY CHOICE AND THE “CAPACITY-THEN-PRODUCTION” GAME ΔΔ＝Δ－Δc
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Result 2. Capacity choice reinforces the “innocent” barriers to the entry 
effect of network externalities.
Figure 5 defines ΔΔ＝Δ－Δc and presents how the introduction of a 
priori decision about capacity makes entry difficult from a different per- 
spective. For given levels of E̅ and T̅, 1) the capacity choice allows the 
incumbent to block entry in an easier manner than without capacity 
commitment even in the absence of network effects,7 and 2) the level of 
network effects, in which capacity choice provides the highest relative 
net profit residual, is at n*Δ＝0.91. However, the capacity choice of firms 
virtually makes no difference in an industry characterized by strong 
network externalities, that is, for values of n→1, ΔΔ→0.  
III. Conclusion
The present work has investigated the effect of network externalities 
on entry. A non-monotonic relation exists in the monopoly/duopoly profit 
differential, which depends on the intensity of the network effect with 
and without capacity choice. If the monopolist has to pay a cost to 
establish a barrier to entry, such as a license fee or lobby expenditures, 
then as profit differential increases, the ability of the incumbent to 
block market entry increases up to a certain level and then subsequently 
decreases. Network externalities represent “innocent” barriers to entry 
for a wide range of parameter space.
The “capacity-then-production” game changes the results when capacity 
choice is considered. The findings are as follows. 1) The incumbent can 
pay higher license fees/lobby expenditures to block entry with capacity 
choice than without it. 2) The strategic capacity choice in the presence 
of network externalities has a costly effect on duopolists which is stronger 
with capacity than without it. As a consequence, the incumbent/entrant 
profit differential is amplified. 3) The incumbent may practically block 
entry for any degree of network externality if license fees/lobby expendi- 
tures are not prohibitive. Thus, the presence of capacity choice magni- 
fies the role of the network effect as an “innocent” barrier to entry.
The present study adds to an extensive understanding of the subject 
of industry entry, which is a central aspect in the comprehension of 
product market competition. The issues investigated in the current work 
7  In this sense, the capacity choice represents by itself an “innocent” barrier 
to entry, which reinforces each other with network effects.
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are far from exhaustive. First, this study has focused on the “innocent” 
effect of network externality on entry. It does not study the incumbent/ 
leader strategic moves, such as the output decision that can deter/ 
accommodate the entry of the entrant/follower according to the 
Stackelberg-Dixit-Spence model.
Second, the analysis has disregarded the effects on consumers and 
overall social welfare. The peculiarity of the network industries should 
be considered when governments and antitrust authorities design an 
appropriate regulatory framework intervention. Therefore, further investi- 
gations in this direction are essential. Moreover, the results are based 
on specific assumptions. The marginal cost of production has been con- 
sidered constant at zero. The positive cost of production with different 
production technologies, such as decreasing returns to scale, and the 
role of research and development investments are other elements that 
merit further research.
(Received 19 November 2015; Revised 22 March 2016; Accepted 4 May 
2016)
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